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NOTES
Inheritance From An Adopted Child
THE INCREASING fiumber of adoptions in the United States
presents a challenge to the courts and legislatures to keep abreast
of the social developments in this field.' Among the many legal
problems created by adoption is that of determining the adop-
tive relatives' rights of inheritance from the adopted child. This
problem has received too little consideration to afford proper pro-
tection to the adoptive family.2
In adoption, which has been recognized since ancient times,3
emphasis initially was placed upon the continuance of the family,
but the later Christian influence stressed protection of the homeless
and destitute child as the dominant motive.4 The early American
statutes on adoption were based upon this latter attitude and gave
the adopted child the right to inherit from his parents by adop-
tion.5 But the legislatures failed to allow the adopted child to
I The Children's Bureau of the U. S. Department of Labor estimated that
there were 50,000 adoption petitions fied in 1944, and there are indications
that the number of adoptions has increased greatly since that time. Smith,
Adoption in SOcIAL WoRK YEARBOOK 22, 24 (1949).
2 BROoKcs, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION 162 (1939); Rics, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
ADOPTION (Child Welfare League) 13 (1937).
3 For a complete account of the history and development of adoption, see
BRooKS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93 et seq.; Appeal of Woodward, 81 Conn. 152,
70 At. 453 (1908); Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906).
4 BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 96.
5 According to KNox, THE FAnmY AND Tm LAW 98 (1941), the first adoption
statute in this country was passed by Massachusetts in 1851. Mass. Acts and
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inherit through his adoptive parents6 and to allow the adoptive
parents and adoptive kin to inherit from the child.7 The failure to
allow the adopted child to inherit through the adopting parents
was probably due to a reluctance to have the adoption procedure
bind persons who were not parties to it.' The failure to permit the
adoptive relatives to inherit from the child may be attributed
to a desire to protect the child and discourage predatory adoption.'
Gradually, some legislatures gave rights of inheritance from the
adopted child to the adoptive parents and their kin, but these
were limited to property that the adopted child had obtained from
them by gift, will or descent."0 This form of limited inheritance
by the adoptive relatives today is found in a number of states."
Others have broadened the inheritance rights of adoptive rela-
tives; but those which accord the same rights of inheritance to
adoptive relatives as normally are accorded to blood relatives are
a minority.'2
Section 10512-23 of the Ohio General Code provides:
... The natural parents, if living, shall be divested of all
legal rights and obligations due from them to the (adopted)
child or from the child to them, and the child shall be free
from all legal obligations of obedience or otherwise to such
Resolves of 1851, c. 324. Subsequent statutes in other states appear to have
been patterned after the Massachusetts act. E.g., Wis. Gen. Acts of 1853, c. 85;
Maine Acts and Resolves of 1855, c. 189; N.H. Laws of 1862, c. 2603; R.I. Acts
of 1866, c. 627. The failure of the early American adoption statutes to provide
adequately for inheritance rights may have been caused by a reluctance to
encroach upon the Anglo-American concept of blood descent. In Kuhlmann,
Intestate Succession By and From The Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U. L. Q. 221, 246
(1943), the author explains this reluctance by the fact that "adoption pro-
cedures were too questionable to merit revision of the well-established common
law rules of intestate succession."
6 Kuhlmann, supra note 5, at 225.
7Ibid.
8 Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898); Quigley v. Mitchell,
41 Ohio St. 375 (1884).
9 Kuhlmann, supra note 5, at 225. It is doubtful that such predatory motives
exist to any appreciable degree. The main motives for adoption are an interest
in children, a desire for affectionate response and an insurance against the in-
security of old age (the last not necessarily implying support). BROOKs, ADVEN-
TURING IN ADOPTION 183 (1939); see also PRENTICE, AN ADOPTED CILD LooKs
AT ADOPTION 176 et seq. (1940).
20 E.g., Ill. Stat., c. 4, § 6 (Hurd, 1874); Pa. Laws of 1887, Act No. 22; Mich.
Pub. Acts of 1891, Act No. 81. It is probable that the purpose of these pro-
visions was not to accord reciprocal rights to the adopter but to keep this
property in the family. The entire history of adoption shows an aversion to
allowing blood strangers to inherit the property of others.
11 See notes 22 and 34 infra.
12 See notes 21 and 33 infra.
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parents; and the adopting parent or parents of the child
shall be invested with every legal right in respect to
obedience and maintenance on the part of the child as if
said child had been born to them in lawful wedlock; and
the child shall be invested with every legal right, privilege,
obligation and relation in respect to education, mainte-
nance and the rights of inheritance to real estate, or to
the distribution of personal estate on the death of such
adopting parent or parents as if born to them in lawful
wedlock; provided, such child shall not be capable of inher-
iting property expressly limited to heirs of the body of the
adopting parent or parents; but shall be capable of inher-
iting property expressly limited by will or by operation of
law to the child or children, heir or heirs at law, or next
of kin, of the adopting parent or parents, or to a class
including any of the foregoing, and provided, also, if such
adopting parent or parents shall have other child or chil-
dren, then the children by birth and adoption shall, respec-
tively, inherit from and through each other as if all had
been children of the same parents born in lawful wedlock.
Nothing in this act shall be construed as debarring a
legally adopted child from inheriting property of its nat-
ural parents or other kin ...
This statute has been construed to allow the adopted child to
inherit through as well as from the adopting parents."8 Since the
statute expressly preserves the right of an adopted child to inherit
from his natural family, the only remaining problem is that of
inheritance from the adopted child.
The first Ohio case to raise the issue of inheritance from an
adopted child was Upson v. Noble, 4 in which the natural mother
and the adoptive parents claimed the property of the child. The
court held that the adoption statute, being in derogation of the
13 White v. Meyer, 66 Ohio App. 549, 37 N.E.2d 546 (1940) (adopted child
permitted to inherit property of sister of deceased adoptive parent), 8 OHIO ST.
L.J. 113 (1941); cf. Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946)
(adopted child held within the term "issue" in the "anti-lapsing" statute);
In re Estate of Friedman, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 22 (Ct. App. 1949) (adopted child
held to be lineal descendant of adoptive grandfather for purpose of giving his
succession, under the will of the grandfather, a greater exemption and lower
rate of taxation). These decisions, based on a 1931 amendment to the Adoption
Code, 114 Ohio Laws 474, overrule a long line of cases holding that an adopted
child cannot inherit through his adopting parents. In respect to this issue, the
present statute is the same as the 1931 amendment.
14 35 Ohio St. 655 (1880).
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common law, should be strictly construed; to allow the adoptive
parents to inherit in preference to the natural parent would
change the course of descent and distribution and ignore all merit
on account of blood; since the statute made the child the legal
heir of the adopter without an explicit reciprocal provision in
favor of the adopter, the property should be awarded to the natu-
ral mother.
The Upson case appears to be the only Ohio decision involv-
ing inheritance rights of adoptive parents. In Ransom v. New
York, C. & St. L. Ry., '" the adoptive parents were allowed to re-
cover for the wrongful death of their adopted child. By manifest-
ing a liberal and humanitarian attitude toward the adoption
statute, the court seemingly overrules the Upson case in princi-
ple.' But inasmuch as inheritance rights were not involved in the
Ransom case, a court, confronted with the problem in the future,
might revert to the strict construction theory of the Upson case'
and deny the right of the adopting parents to inherit from the
adopted child.
Since the Upson and Ransom cases were decided, the adop-
tion statute has not been changed to give an explicit right of in-
heritance to the adopting parents, although it was amended to
allow the natural and adopted children of the adopting parents
to inherit from and through each other." There seems to be no
logical reason why the natural children of the adopter should have
a right of inheritance and not the adopter also. Therefore, it may
be that the legislature, in enacting this amendment, assumed that
the adopting parents already had the right to inherit from the
adopted child and felt that it was not necessary explicitly to give
them a right. But a court, interpreting this statute, might hold
that, since it gives an express right of inheritance to the natural
children of the adopter without a similar express provision for
15 93 Ohio St. 223, 112 N.E. 586 (1915).
1 6 DIEBEL, Omo PROBATE LAW § 1184 n. 2 (1948).
17 This would be in direct contravention of Omo GENERAL CODE § 10214,
which provides that the rule of construction that statutes in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed has no application to the portions of
the code of which the adoption provisions are a part. But cf. National Bank of
Lima v. Hancock, 85 Ohio App. 1, 88 N.E.2d 67 (1948), discussed infra, in
which the court followed the strict construction theory of the Upson case in
denying any right of inheritance to the adoptive collateral kin.
Is 109 Ohio Laws 179 (1921). The statute on which the decisions in the Upson
and Ransom cases were based may be found in 56 Ohio Laws 82 (1859).
[December
NOTES
the adopter, the legislature did not intend to allow the adopting
parents to inherit from the adopted child. 9
The legislature's failure to provide an indisputable right of
inheritance for the adopting parents appears to be inconsistent
with sound social and legislative policies. In most cases of adop-
tion, the children care little about their natural parents and re-
gard their adoptive parents as their own, feeling a strong sense
of responsibility toward them.2" It is doubtful that they would
care to have their property descend to their natural parents in
preference to their adoptive parents. Also, the distribution of the
adopted child's property to his natural family creates an inequi-
table result. It is the adopting parents who have assumed the
normal parental responsibilities and duties toward the child and
have given him the opportunity to accumulate an estate.' And
the estate ought to be distributed to those who have made its
existence possible. Furthermore, since the adopted child may in-
herit from the adopting parent, the logical extension of this rule
is that reciprocal rights be accorded to the parents. Such an
extension has been expressly made in statutes of twenty-four states
and territories.2 In ten states the legislatures have made the
source of the property determinative of the right of the adoptive
parents to inherit,22 while sixteen states, including Ohio, have no
19 See National Bank of Lima v. Hancock, 85 Ohio App. 1, 15, 88 N.E.2d 67, 74
(1948) where the court states that the application of the clause that "the
natural parents of the child, if living, shall be divested of all legal rights and
obligations due ... from the child to them" is limited to rights other than
rights of inheritance.
20 LocmUDGE, ADOPTING A CMI 152 (1947); BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN
ADOPTION 32 (1939).
21 ALASKA CouP. LAws ANN. § 21-3-21 (1949); CALIF. PROBATE CODE § 257
(Deering, 1941); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 4, § 5 (1935); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6869
(1949); D. C. CODE § 16-205 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.30 (1944); HAWAII
REv. LAWS § 12278 (1945); IowA CODE § 636.32 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. §
59-507 (Supp. 1947); Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.080 (Baldwin's, 1942); LA. GEN.
STAT. § 9734.6 (Dart, 1939); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(164) (1943) (per-
sonal property); MIxN. STAT. ANN. § 259.07 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §
9614 (Supp. 1948); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-110 (1943); Nev. Laws, c. 152, § 5
(1941); N. Y. Dou. REL. LAW § 115; N. C. Laws, c. 832, § 1, c. 879, § 1 (1947),
amending N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1, 28-149 (1943); ORE. Copn. LAWS ANN.§ 63-407 (a) (Supp. 1947); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon, Supp. 1948);
TEXAS STAT. ANN., art. 46a, § 9 (Vernon's Civil, 1947); VT. STAT. § 9954
(1947); Wash. Laws of 1943, c. 268, § 12, amending WASH. REV. STAT. § 1699
(1932); Wis. STAT. § 322.07 (1947). Many of these statutes have been passed
either to adopt or to overrule previous court decisions.
22 Four states limit the adoptive parents' right of inheritance to property re-
ceived by the child from the adoptive family. Asuz. CODE ANN. § 39-103 (1939);
ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd, 1941); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-121
1949)
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explicit statutory provision allowing the adoptive parents to in-
herit from the adopted child.23 The statutes of two states expressly
deny the right of inheritance of the adoptive parent.24
As to the right of the natural parents to inherit from an
adopted child-fifteen jurisdictions have express statutory provi-
sions denying this right.25 The statutes of thirteen others, which
expressly limit the adoptive relatives' inheritance rights to certain
property, either expressly or impliedly allow the natural parents
to inherit the remainder,2" while those of three states allow the
natural parents to inherit only in 'the absence of adoptive rela-
tives. 7 The statutes of the nineteen remaining states, including
Ohio, have no explicit provision on this point and are subject to
diverse interpretation.2"
(Burn's, 1933; Repl. 1946); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, § 53 (Supp. 1948). Six
states allow the adoptive parents to inherit all property except that received by
the adopted child from his natural family. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109(b) (1947);
ME. REv. STAT., c. 145, § 38 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 210, § 7 (1933);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(156) (1943) (real property); N. H. Rxv. LAWS,
c. 345, § 5 (1942); VA. CODE ANN. § 5333h(b) (1942).
23 ALA. CODE, tit. 27, § 5 (1940); Del. Laws of 1937, c. 187, p. 622, amending
DEL. REV. CODE, c. 88, § 3551 (1935); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1508, -1509 (1947);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 16, § 85k (Flack's, Supp. 1947); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1269
(1942); MONT. REv. CODE §§ 5863, 5864 (1935); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-9
(1939); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1941); N. D. REv. CODE §§ 14-1113,
-1114 (1943); Omo GEN. CODE § 10512-23; R. I. GEN. LAWS, c. 420 (1938);
S. C. CODE OF LAWS § 8679 (1942); S. D. CODE § 14.0407 (1939); UTAH REv.
STAT. §§ 14-4-10, -11 (1933); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4759 (1943); WYo. Corn'.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58-204, 58-216 (1945).
24 GA. CODE ANN. § 74-404 (1935) (only adopting father denied the right);
TENN. CODE § 9570 (Williams, 1934).
2 SAASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 21-3-21 (1949); CAUIP. PROB. CODE § 257
(Deering, 1941); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 4, § 5 (1935); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6869
(1949); D. C. CODE § 16-205 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.30 (1944); HAwAII
REv. LAWS § 12278 (1945); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-2103 (Supp. 1947); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(164) (1943) (personal property); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.07 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-110 (1943); N. Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115;
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon, Supp. 1948); TEXAs STAT. ANN., art.
46a, § 9 (Vernon's Civil, 1947); VT. STAT. § 9954 (1947); Wash. Laws of 1943,
c. 268, § 12, amending WASH. REv. STAT. § 1699 (1932).
2 6 ARuz. CODE ANN. § 39-103 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109b (1947);
Del. Laws of 1937, c. 187, p. 622, amending DEL. REv. CODE, C. 88, § 3551
(1935); ILL. ANN. STAT., C. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd, 1941); IND. STAT. ANN. §
3-121 (Burn's, 1933; Repl. 1946); ME. REv. STAT., C. 145, § 38 (1944); MAss.
ANN. LAws, c. 210, § 7 (1933); Mic. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(156) (1943) (real
property); N. H. REv. LAws, c. 345, § 5 (1942); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-9
(1939); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, § 53 (Supp. 1948); VA. CODE ANN. § 5333h
(1942); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4759 (1943).
27 IOWA CODE § 636.43 (1946); Ky. REv. STAT. § 391.080(2) (Baldwin's, 1942);
Wis. STAT. § 322.07 (1947).
28 Most of these states have provisions to the effect that the natural parents
shall be freed of all the obligations and duties toward the child and the latter
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The problem that has received the least attention is that of
inheritance by the adoptive relatives, other than parents, from
the adopted child. This is probably the most frequently occurring
problem. In the recent case of National Bank of Lima v. Han-
cock, 9 the adopted child died intestate, leaving no spouse or issue.
The decedent had inherited property from her adoptive mother
and brother, which property was identifiable at her death. The
adoptive cousins of the decedent and the children of the de-
cedent's natural half-brother claimed the right of inheritance
to this property. The court, following the strict construction theory
presented by the Upson case, awarded the property to the blood
kin. Although the court's approach to the problem seems rather
narrow,"0 it is doubtful that a liberal interpretation of the adop-
tion statute would achieve a different result. The fault lies with
the legislature. The result in the Hancock case is an example of
the "unjust, unanticipated and unconscionable dispositions of
intestate estates" caused by the uncertainties and inadequacies of
our adoption laws."'
In several states where the statutes were not explicit as to the
right of the adoptive relatives to inherit from the adopted child,
the courts have recognized this right in respect to property which
shall be freed of all obligations of obedience and maintenance to them; others,
that the adoptee shall be treated in all respects as the child of the adopter; and
still others, that all rights and duties and all legal relationship between the
child and his natural parents shall cease.
29 85 Ohio App. 1, 88 N.E.2d 67 (1948).
30 See note 18 supra.
3' Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From The Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U. L-
Q. 221, 244 (1943).
Another gross injustice is illustrated by a recent Michigan decision. In 1939,
the adoption-inheritance provisions in that state were re-enacted into the new
probate code. Prior to that time the statute provided: "Whenever any person
heretofore or hereafter adopted by any person or persons ... shall die inte-
state, leaving no issue, any real estate of which such person dies seized (except
such real estate as may have come to such deceased person by inheritance from
his or her natural parents) shall descend to the adopting parent or parents or
their legal representatives in the same proportions as though such adopting
parents had been the natural parents of said deceased person." MICH. STAT.
Am. § 26.994 (1937). In the process of re-enactment the words "or their legal
representatives" were omitted. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(156) (1943). In
In re Loakes' Estate, 320 Mich. 674, 32 N. W. 2d 10 (1948), the brothers of the
adopting mother claimed the right of inheritance of realty that the deceased
adopted child had acquired upon the death of his adopting mother. The court
held that the new statute gives realty to the adopting parents only and makes
no provision for other members of the adoptive family; since the adoptive
parents were dead, the property escheated to the state.
There are other decisions equally harsh, but fortunately they have been cor-
rected by legislation.
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the child inherited from his adopter. The argument of these
courts is that prospective adopters would be discouraged from
adopting children if they knew that their property, subsequently
inherited by the adopted child, might finally go to strangers in
preference to their own kin. 2 This argument disregards the fact
that such an adverse result may be obviated by will. Also, in
view of the current trend in adoptions, it is doubtful that such a
factor is significant in discouraging them.
The legislative trend is toward allowing the adoptive collateral
kin to inherit from the adopted child. Fifteen jurisdictions have'
explicit statutory provisions permitting them to inherit from the
child, 3 while the statutes of twelve states regard the source of
the estate as determinative of their right to inherit.34 Five states,
including Ohio, have statutory provisions according reciprocal
rights of inheritance to natural and adopted children of the adopt-
ing parents.3" The statutes of the other twenty-two states con-
32 Alexander v. Lamar, 188 Ga. 273, 279, 3 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1936); Shepard v.
Murphy, 332 Mo. 1176, 1184, 61 S.W.2d 746, 749 (1933); In re Havsgord's
Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 136, 147 N.W. 378, 380 (1914).
33 ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 21-3-21 (1949); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 4, § 5
(1935); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6869 (1949); D. C. CODE § 16-205 (1941); IOWA
CODE § 636.42 (1946); Ky. REv. STAT. § 391.080(2) (Baldwin's, 1942) (adop-
tive relatives share equally with natural relatives); MCH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(164) (1943) (personal property); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.07(4) (1947); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 43.110 (1943); Nev. Laws, c. 152, § 5 (1941); ORE. CoUP. LAWS
ANN. § 63-407(a) (Supp. 1947); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon, Supp.
1948); TExAs STAT. ANN., art. 46a, § 9 (Vernon's Civil, 1947); Wash. Laws of
1943, c. 268, § 12, amending WASH. REv. STAT. § 1699 (1932); Wis. STAT. §
322.07 (1947). Many of these statutes overruled decisions denying the right
of inheritance.
34 Five states permit the adoptive relatives to inherit all the property except
that which came from the natural family. Anx. STAT. ANN. § 56.109(b) (1947);
ME. REv. STAT., c. 145, § 38 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 210, § 7 (1933);
N. H. REv. LAWS, c. 345, § 5 (1942); VA. CODE ANN. § 5333h(b) (1942). Seven
states limit the inheritance right to property which came from the adoptive
family. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 39-103 (1939); Del. Laws of 1937, c. 187, p. 622,
amending DEL. REv. CODE, C. 88, § 3551 (1935); ILL. STAT. ANN., c. 3, § 165
(Smith-Hurd, 1941); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-121 (Bums, 1933; Repl. 1946);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-9 (1939); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, § 53 (Supp. 1948);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4759 (1943). Prior to 1944 Ohio had a similar provision
in its statute. When the Adoption Code was amended in 1943, this provision
was omitted. 120 Ohio Laws 440. When the original bill was introduced in
the House, it contained no change in Section 10512-23. H. B. No. 279, 95th
General Assembly 10 (1943). However, the House Judiciary Committee, to
which it was referred, reported out a substitute bill omitting the provision
allowing the adoptive relatives to take property which the adopted child had
inherited from his adopting parents. SUB. H.B. No. 279, 95th General Assem-
bly 10 (1943). No minutes or reports of this committee are available, and the
writer has been unable to discover the reason for this omission.
35 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-9 (1939); N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115; Omo GEN.
CODE § 10512-23; VT. STAT. § 9954 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4759 (1943).
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tain no provision pertaining to the right of adoptive relatives to
inherit from the adopted child. The inadequate statutory cover-
age of this problem has resulted in uncertainty and confusion
among the courts.
Social scientists regard the adopting family as a complete
substitute for the natural family in every respect except the bio-
logical. This theory is based on the belief that the essence of
parenthood is sociological rather than merely physiological." This
view finds support in the practical aspect of adoption. Upon
adoption, contacts and associations with the natural parents ordi-
narily cease. In most cases the adopted child has either no
knowledge of, or no acquaintance with, his natural parents and
relatives." Adopted children commonly think of their adoptive
relatives and ancestors as their own, and the relatives in turn
accept the children as their blood kin." Thus the paradox exists
that, while the social scientist very properly views adoption as
creating a relationship equal to that of the natural family and
strives to aid the development of such a relationship, some legis-
latures, by an anachronistic over-stressing of blood lineage, are
deterring the attainment of this desirable end.
In order to help society obtain the fullest benefits from adop-
tion, all rights of inheritance between the adopted child and his
natural family should be severed;39 and reciprocal rights of in-
36 BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION 136 (1939).
37 CLARKE, SOCIAL LEGISLATION 305 (1940).
38 BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 31, at 70 and 186. This is particularly true of
children adopted at an early age. Statistical findings show that most children
who are adopted are very young. In a California survey, it was found that
three-fourths of the children were placed in adoptive homes by the time they
were six months of age. Smith, Adoption in SOCIAL WORK YEARBOOK 22, 24
(1949). In another survey, 88 per cent of the children placed independently or
by agency were found to be under the age of six, and 55 per cent under the age
of one. COLBY, PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN ADOPTION (Children's Bur.,
Dept. of Labor, Pub. No. 262) 28 (1941).
39 This would be in accord with the ancient Roman law of adoption, "one
incident of which was that the adopted child took on the full rights of a child in
its new family and lost its birth rights, becoming a stranger and alien in the
family of its origin." Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 463, 98 S.W. 585, 586
(1906).
As a practical matter the adopted child seldom inherits from his natural
relatives. Adoption records, which may be located in a county or state other
than that in which the natural relative dies, are confidential; and the welfare
agencies advise against the disclosure of the identity of the adopting and natural
families to each other. Therefore, the administrator of an intestate estate seldom
has knowledge of any adoption out of that family, and, even if he has such
knowledge, it is ordinarily difficult to locate the child.
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